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ELDER INVESTMENTS: A CRITIQUE OF
PROFESSIONAL AND CONSUMER MEDIOCRITY
Errold F. Moody Jr.*
The elderly continue to face an alarmingly high level of
fraud and unprofessional behavior by numerous advisors and
salespeople within the securities, insurance, and financial
planning industries. The situation shows no signs of improving,
in part because of the poor training of governmental licensees
and proliferation of secondary licenses and titles used by
investment, insurance, and planning "professionals" to earn the
trust of the elderly. The services provided by the titleholder are
often complex, difficult for people to understand, completely
They are used to
misunderstood, or simply fabricated.
encourage elders to invest their money in ways unsuitable to
their best interests.' Evidence of the complexity of the problem
* The author has thirty-five years' experience in personal financial
planning for individuals and small businesses. He received a BSCE in
1966 from Worcester Polytech, LLB in 1974 from LaSalle, MBA and
PhD in 1979 from the University of Beverly Hills, and a MSFP in 1991
from the College for Financial Planning. He has taught courses for all
the securities licenses (4, 6 ,7, 8, 22, 24, 27, 52, 63, as discussed herein),
continuing education classes for insurance and real estate licensees,
CPAs, and attorneys (the only course ever approved for continuing
education in investment application by the California State Bar). He
has taught courses for certified financial planners (CFPs) and real
estate agents for the University of California at Irvine and Berkeley.
He also has served as an arbitrator for the NASD and PSE. He is a B-1
General Contractor, Real Estate Broker, has a Series 65 Securities
License, and a Life Insurance License. He is one of only thirty-three
people in California licensed as a Life and Disability Insurance Analyst.
During the last ten years he has offered expert witness testimony on a
wide variety of financial issues.
1. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), Investors' Best Practices:
Common Investor Problems and How to Avoid Them, http://www.finra.org/Investors/
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can be found in the requirements to obtain these licenses,
designations, and titles. Unfortunately, these licenses and
various designations and titles do not demand that individual
licensees necessarily understand the fundamentals of investing. 2
Further, most are not subject to government oversight or
regulation.3 Industry licenses and designations - supposedly
portraying knowledge and competence - abound, but only a
couple are worthy of consideration. Because the industry does
not require a fundamental knowledge base to obtain a financial
planning designation, planner incompetence can make it
impossible for the consumer to understand the investment
process and, as a result, millions of dollars of consumer money
are lost each year because the supposed experts marketing these
products lack an understanding of their features and nuances.4
Or, they simply don't care to find out.
That said, most consumers undertake little effort to
reasonably review their financial service purchases. More often,
the primary focus for the selection of an advisor is based on the
establishment of a personal relationship that has nothing to do
with financial competency.5 Most notable are looks, golf game,
and similar religions. Consumers, perhaps particularly older
people on limited budgets, are particularly susceptible to
solicitations offering free giveaways or food seminars.6 As a
result, thousands of the elderly "invested" millions of dollars for
debatable products primarily in exchange for dead chickens. It
is absolutely tacky, but true.
In an effort to protect senior investors, the states and the
(last
ProtectYourself/BeforeYoulnvest/AvoidCommonlnvestorProblems/index.htm
visited Nov. 21, 2008).
2. On fundamentals of risk, diversification, etc., see especially infra notes 107-119 and
accompanying text.
3. See John A. Gray, Reforms to Improve Client Protection and Compensation
Against Personal Financial Planners' Unethical Business Practices,32 AM. BUS. L.J. 245,
254 (1994) [Reforms to Improve].
4. See Reforms to Improve, supra note 3, at 253-55.
5. See FINRA, Senior Fraud Risk Survey, www.finra.org/web/groups/
(last visited Nov. 21,
Investors/@inv/@smart/documents/Investors/PO36813.pdf
2008).
6. Id.
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federal government subsequently began to monitor the practices
of advisors who exercise these free lunches.7 But such effort is
well after the fact; the financial damage has been done. More
importantly, psychological damage has been done when
susceptible people recognize they have been duped. And the
older people typically are even more disinclined to pursue other,
more appropriate, financing packages that their expanding
budgets and limited resources would warrant. Given such real
life emotion, along with current lax or nil oversight by either
governmental or professional organizations of unsuitable
from
the
investor will not be protected
activity,
unknowledgeable or unscrupulous agents.
Critics may initially feel that this commentary is
controversial or off-base considering the millions of dollars
spent by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), North American
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), Department of
Labor (DOL) and every state insurance department to offer
supposed guidance, making sure that investments of any type
will be suitable given the needs and circumstances of the
individual investor.8 Millions are spent in licensing training for
thousands who enter the business each year, yet there is no
training on suitability. 9 When the current system fails, millions
more are spent in arbitrations, mediations, and lawsuits to
address the failed suitability of the approved investments. 0
This article asserts that investor problems are caused
primarily by one major issue - lack of knowledge. Knowledge is
woefully nonexistent at all levels in American financing,

7. Securities Exchange Commission, Protecting Senior Investors: Report of
Examinations of Securities Firms Providing "Free Lunch" Sales Seminars, at 2,
www.sec.gov/spotlight/seniors/freelunchreport.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
8. See John A. Gray, Personal Liability Exposure of Financial Planners: Private
Enforcement, 36 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 623, 630-31 (1991-1992) [Gray].
9. See Susan K. Foster, Financial Planning: Is It Time for a Self-Regulatory
Organization?,53 BROOK. L. REV. 143, 143, 149 (1987-1988).
10. See FINRA, Dispute Resolution Statistics, http://www.finra.org/Arbitration
Mediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/index.htm (showing that 21.5% of arbitration
cases were the result of disputes over unsuitability) (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
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investing, and retirement planning." This article examines the
various recent systemic failures that demonstrate how lack of
knowledge, along with forces and incentives, continue to
promote system failure despite its grievous impact on
individuals, especially the elderly who rely on their investments
for income when they can no longer work. The first section of
this article reviews the knowledge required to qualify for
various levels of individual licensing. The second section of this
article provides an overview of the financial products available
in the market and attempts to analyze where the failures in
investor knowledge are most apparent.
LICENSING OF INDIVIDUALS TO SELL AND ADVISE

With the following education, individuals can hold licenses
to advise the public and other licensed individuals regarding
investments and other products.
THE SERIES 7 GENERAL SECURITIES LICENSE

This is licensing for general securities registered
representatives, including most stockbrokers.12 The Series 7
securities license concentrates study of various elements of
stocks and bonds, leading to a six-hour qualifying exam.' 3 This
license represents less than one college course on finance. While
the course materials cover some investment fundamentals, other
important fundamentals are not covered, such as alpha, beta,
correlation, diversification, asset allocation, standard deviation,
Monte Carlo, and more.14 Instruction covers what material the
student is tested on, but not what is needed for real life
application. Continuing education was mandated in the early
1990s, but none of it demands knowledge of the fundamentals
11. See Gray, supra note 8, at 629.
12. See FINRA, Content Outline for the General Securities Registered Representative
Examination (Series 7), 1, http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corp-comm/documents
/home-page/p038201.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
13. See id.
14. See generally id. (failing to cover the latter three terms).
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either.15
For example, no instruction for the use of a financial
calculator is mandated. 1 6 Basic mastery of a financial calculator
is imperative. Such a calculator can calculate present and future
value. For example, it can tell you what a value of an asset will
be in the future given the time and return, or what an asset to be
received in the future might be worth now given the same
particulars and an assumed inflation rate. Admittedly, there are
preprogrammed computer software programs that can do the
basics, but the personal capability with such a calculator allows
personalized input for a particular investor. If an advisor cannot
even use a financial calculator, it is impossible for that advisor to
discuss money or how it works.
FINRA is the largest
independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in
the United States and oversee nearly 5,000 brokerage firms,
175,000 branch offices and 680,000 registered securities
representatives.17 None has ever had any financial calculator
training during securities licensing training.
Due to this
unbelievable "oversight," it is debatable if FINRA officers can
use one. I think not.
Further, very little formal guidelines exist for suitability to
match investment and investor. Diversification, by the numbers,
is not even touched upon. An advisor who does not understand
diversification cannot understand risk, and therefore cannot
understand suitability. Hence, they should not be used except
with extreme skepticism or for very specific purposes.
As author Rick Ferri noted,
In this surreal world of investment advice, anyone can
claim to be an expert and get paid for it. This is why
most stockbrokers, financial planners, and insurance
15. See American Investment Training, FINRA NASD CE for Firm Element,
http://www.aitraining.com/firmelementce.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
16. See Financial Calculators - KJE Computer Solutions, LLC website, Basic
Financial Calculator, http://www.dinkytown.net/java/FinCalc3.html#defn
(last
visited Nov. 21, 2008) (The "basic financial calculator works just like a pocket
financial calculator. In addition to the normal calculator arithmetic it can also
calculate present value, future value, payments, or number of periods.").
17. FINRA, www.finra.org/index.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
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agents are in the business, and why accountants,
attorneys, and bankers want in as well. The problem is,
most investment advisors are borderline incompetent.
Thousands of them lack the basic investment skills and
knowledge of a first-year business student.18
Pundits may raise a hew and cry regarding such comments.
But then, how could Lehman, Merrill, et al., go down the tubes if
risk and suitability were formally taught and understood?
SERIES 24 GENERAL SECURITIES PRINCIPAL LICENSE

This license is for those who supervise the activities of other
agents, generally Series 7 brokers. 19 Topics that are tested
include Supervision of Investment Banking, Trading Market
Supervision, Sales Supervision, Primary and Secondary Markets,
Investment Companies, and Supervising Customer Accounts
and Orders. 20 But nothing on the application of products.
Most licenses in the securities industry fall in the above two
categories. In each case the dominant focus for consumer
protection -

a complete understanding of suitability - is

noticeable by its inadequacy. For each of these licenses, while
the suitability of investments is covered to a small degree, there
is insufficient training to formally protect consumers.
INSURANCE SALES LICENSE

All states now require that individuals obtain a license in
order to sell life insurance. 21 However, the coursework
requirements can vary greatly between states from mandated
formal instruction in a classroom. California, for example,
requires thirty-two hours of training, including twelve hours on
18. RIcHARD A. FERRI, PROTECTING YOUR WEALTH IN GOOD TIMES AND BAD, 84
(McGraw-Hill) (2003).
19. American Investment Training, Series 24 License, http://www.aitraining
.com/series24.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
20. Id.
21. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2
(2008-2009 Ed.), http://www.b1s.gov/oco/ocos118.htm#training (last visited Nov. 21,
2008) (Insurance Sales Agents section).
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ethics, and Alabama requires a mere twenty hours of training.22
Other states, such as Idaho and Arizona, have no formal
classroom instruction. 23
There is a valid reason why the consumer has a negative
impression of insurance salespeople. Forgetting the incentives
of commissions to sell regardless of suitability, the background
instruction is abysmal. Even California, with its thirty-two hour
life insurance only course, which is more extensive than any
other state at this time, fails to demand a review of product
suitability. 24 There is no mandatory instruction for the use of a
financial calculator, as described above. There is nothing on an
analysis of policy illustration explaining, supposedly, how the
policy will work over time. This training is critical since it is
used in almost any sales attempt. It is also a main element in
complaints and law suits because it can be manipulated in
various--almost indecipherable--methods. It can only be hoped
that the financial advisor learns these skills. However, the
author has not found this to occur.
In addition to this lack of training, there is the almost
exponential increase in product types including variable
annuities, life insurance, equity indexed funds, and every type of
combination one can imagine.
Few advisors, let alone
customers, are able to understand all of these product types. For
example, as a person with experience in the field, the author
knows agents should also be familiar with Stranger Owned Life
Insurance and Viatical Settlements. However, even the most
stringent state licensing instruction requirement, like California,
covers none of these in detail, if at all.2 5 This is problematic
given that sellers need to fully understand these products in
order to effectively utilize them for customers. Therefore, many
22. Id.
23. See id.; California Department of Insurance, Agents & Brokers: How Can I Get
a License?, http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0200-industry/0050-renew-license/0200requirements/personal-lines/how.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
24. See id. (failing to mention product suitability as being one of the educational
objectives).
25. See id. (failing to mention Stranger Owned Life Insurance or Viatical
Settlements in the educational objectives).
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agents are decidedly poorly trained to advise consumers
because they are unfamiliar with the products they are selling.
To compensate for this lack of knowledge, they distribute
whatever information and marketing material that they might
receive from the life company or an insurance agency, and this
marketing collateral is primarily designed to sell the product.
The author does note that various caveats are offered in some
marketing collateral and within the formal contracts, yet there is
hardly any person, including insurance staff and officers, who
truly understand the implications of the rhetoric. Consumers do
not read the contract. For the few that might attempt it, without
an insurance background, they will not understand it.
Nevertheless, if one is seeking insurance, the only way an
individual can get information on such products is by consulting
with a licensed agent. 26 There is no service that provides
information or critiques about the innumerable policies for
consumers. The insurance companies only send the information
to agents via mailing and e-mail lists purchased from state
insurance departments. 27 As a result, consulting a licensed
insurance sales agent is the best and probably only way to get
the most current information on the products. 28
CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER (CFP) LICENSE

13

The CFP license is the most common financial advisor
designation in the United States. 29 Note that this is NOT a
formal license by any governmental entity--merely a designation
bestowed by the CFP Board of Standards if certain criteria have
been met. The training covers seven courses that include:
General Principles of Financial Planning, Insurance Planning
26. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 21.

27. See id.
28. CPAs and attorneys, including estate-planning attorneys, do not have
access to this material. While professionals may want and need it, they cannot get it
unless they are licensed as described above.
29. George Steven Swan, The Law and Economics of Interprofessional Frontier
Skirmishing: Financial PlanningAssociation v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 16
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 75, 96 (2007).
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and Risk Management, Employee Benefits Planning, Investment
Planning, Income Tax Planning, Retirement Planning, and Estate
Planning.3 0 The CFP courses encompass about one semester of
college work. Some students will attend a formal classroom,
though it is not necessary to prepare for the exam, as a student
can take the courses via self-study. 31
Under guidelines enacted in 2007, new licensees are
required to pass a ten-hour exam. 32 As of March 1, 2007, a new
licensee is also required to have a college degree.33 However, the
degree can be in any discipline. 34 Licensees are required to have
three years of experience before they are permitted to provide
financial planning to customers.35
This designation is highly marketed and coveted because of
the supposed ability to do comprehensive planning for the
The problem becomes that the consumer
consumer. 36
reasonably perceives that the licensee will offer sophisticated
planning, but basic requirements do not provide the knowledge
to make that expectation realistic. For instance, when the author
got the designation in 1984, he found that the material did
provide insight into many areas that would not have been
identified through any other licensing curriculum. The caveat
was that the material did not make one very astute or
knowledgeable in the complicated and immense subject matter.
A review of course material shows that not much has
30. Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., The Education
Requirement Guide to CFP Certification, http://www.cfp.net/become/education.asp
(last visited Nov. 21, 2008) [hereinafter The EducationRequirement].
31. Id.
32. Id.; Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., Topic List for CFP
Certification Examination: Schedules and Deadlines, http://www.cfp.net/downloads/
Financial%20Planning%20Topics%202006.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
33. Id.; The Education Requirement, supra note 30.
34. Id.
35. Id., Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., Work Experience
Guide to CFP Certification: Work Experience Standards, http://www.cfp.net/become
/work.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
36. See Work Experience Guide to CFP Certification, supra note 35; Certified
Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., Guide to CFP Certification,
http://www.cfp.net/become/certification.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2008) [hereinafter
Guide to CFP Certification].
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changed since the author completed the course in 1984. For
example, the material still does not adequately demonstrate risk
(though little was statistically notable or available in 1984).
Statements from a CFP "graduate" in 2004 indicated that
diversification was not taught. The Brinson Beebower review
offers asset allocation modeling but with the wrong focus. 37
Also problematic is that none of the models is complete or
applied to actual situations. There is no material regarding the
odds of loss (addressed below). In other words, without a
definitive study of each area of financial planning, and without
applying this information to real-life scenarios by professionals,
there is nothing to guarantee that students will come away with
competent and thorough planning expertise. The author notes
that some instructors and material may try to offer real life
examples, but a one-semester orientation to planning in no way
indicates comprehensiveness nor competency by the instructor.
Finally, another critical area of study to consider is
insurance. It is well-known in the industry that this section of
CFP study is inherently weak. The CFP exam does not cover the
material as inclusively as the licensing exam for California (the
only state the author can comment on directly), or as inclusively
as the Life and Disability Insurance Analyst exam.38 However,
despite these problems, one positive note is that, unlike some of
the other licensing requirements, the CFP instruction exam
requires the ability to use a financial calculator, which at least
ensures that CFPs will possess a minimum level of competency
in this area. 39

37. Richard Newell, The Importance of Asset Allocation, http://www.richard
newell.com/asset-allocation.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2008).
38. This author took and passed the exam - and that exam had effectively
nothing to do with the knowledge base provided by my CFP study. I would never
suggest a CFP for insurance advice, because it is just not very strong.
39. See Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., CFP Certification
Examination: Guide to CFP Certification: What to Bring to the Exam,
http://www.cfp.net/become/exam.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
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(CFA) LICENSE

Individuals who possess this designation focus almost
exclusively on investing and minimally on financial planning. 40
Individuals with CFA licenses must go through a highly
disciplined and intense study of investing with a major focus on
stocks, bonds, and portfolio management.41 While the public
might be well advised to use these licensees, they almost always
work for institutions rather than individuals. 42
OTHER FINANCIAL ADVISOR DESIGNATIONS

In addition to the designations discussed above, there are
over one hundred other financial service designations offered to
the public, and more are being added each year.43 For example,
there are also licenses to be a Chartered Financial Consultant
(ChFC), an Accredited Personal Financial Specialist (APFS), and
a Chartered Investment Counselor (CIC), to name a few. 44
Although these various designations may focus on some areas
that might assist consumers with their financial planning, due to
the limited scope, and generally limited instruction required to
obtain them, consumers should not consult with any individual
licensees without doing some personal research into the
licensee's individual background and knowledge. 45 Generally,
the same elements not covered in the CFP instruction are
missing from instruction for these designations. However, the
ChFC is heavily grounded in, and focuses on, insurance
education. But the author has found that the focus is designed
to sell life insurance, for its "ability" to solve most financial

40. See Rick Wayman, What Does "CFA" Mean?, http://www.investopedia.com
/articles/analyst/060302.asp(last visited Nov. 23, 2008.)
41. See id.
42. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 21, Financial Analysts and
Personal Financial Advisors, http://www.b1s.gov/oco/ocos259.htm (last visited Nov.
23, 2008).
43. See Swan, supra note 29, at 95.
44. See Gray, supra note 8, at 630.
45. See Swan, supra note 29, at 95.
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problems. That simply is untrue.
The National Association of Personal Financial Advisors
(NAPFA) is a national organization promoting comprehensive
fee planning. It also touts its "highest standards for professional
competency, comprehensive financial planning, and fee-only
compensation." 46 There are over 200 members in California. 47 In
the mid 1990s the author took them to task for violating state
law. An officer replied, "We always knew what the law was, we
just figured we'd never get caught, and if we did, we'd simply
The law remains intact--further
get the law changed."
necessitating the following statement in 1998 from a meeting by
the State Department of Insurance regarding illegal planners:
Despite some groups' interest in changing current law,
there is an existing law which is, and has always been,
quite clear. While a financial planner may be illegally
engaging in insurance analyst activities and may not be
aware of their violations, it is my hope that this
explanation of policy will provide them with the
impetus to come into compliance or cease the illegal
activity immediately. Per insurance code Section 1844,
any person who acts, offers to act, assumes to act, as a
life and disability insurance analyst when not licensed
by the commissioner per this article . . . is guilty of a

practice,
current
misdemeanor. Consistent with
information obtained on individuals in noncompliance
will be aggressively pursued.48
No NAPFA member has ever complied with the law. Nor
has any other impacted membership (Financial Planning
Association, California CPA Society, American Institute of
CPAs, CFP Board of Standards, College for Financial Planning).
It was expected that the organizations would comply. 49 The
state simply did not have the manpower or money to pursue

Financial
Advisors,
of
Personal
Association
National
46. The
http://www.napfa.org (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
Advisors,
Financial
of
Personal
Association
National
47. The
http://findanadvisor.napfa.org/Home.aspx/Search (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
48. Letter from Jeffrey Kenny, Assistant Ombudsman & Legislative Liaison,
availableat http://www.efmoody.com/cdi.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
49. Interview with John Garamendi, State Insurance Commissioner, 2000.
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widespread noncompliance.
But no matter the lack of
enforcement, one cannot actively violate the law and still be a
fiduciary. This transgression speaks volumes about the industry
overall.
One secondary designation--highly marketed and accepted
by many elderly--(of particular interest) is the Certified Senior
Advisor, which can be earned with only three days of
coursework. 0 The curriculum is so highly focused on marketing
that a few broker dealer firms refuse to let their agents use the
'designation' in any advertising, including business cards. The
idea that a few days of 'study' makes one able to grasp what is
needed to address the complex financial needs of the elderly, or
anyone for that matter, is ludicrous. The same was true for the
Certified Retirement Financial Advisor, which also required just
three days of training.'
Even though the organization is
defunct, it still impressed thousands of seniors enough for them
to invest millions of dollars with inept advisors. The seniors
assumed that the government agencies would scrutinize the
However,
designations beforehand to assure viability.
government scrutiny has not entered the scene until recently,
but only after too many elderly lost their financial reserves.5 2
Starting in the early 1990s, the securities industry instituted
requirements for continuing education.53 Most states require
that insurance sales agents take continuing education courses,
but the number of hours required varies significantly from state
Scrutiny,
Certified
Senior Designations Under
50. Mark
Cussen,
(last
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/professionaleducation/07/seniors.asp
visited Nov. 21, 2008).
51. Certified Retirement Financial Advisor, Financial Planners Target Retirees:
The "Senior" Credentials, http://www.crfa.us/press/kiplinger.html (last visited Nov.
21, 2008).
52. See Cussen, supra note 50. In comparing the licenses, it is notable that while
the CFP and ChFC are limited in depth, they are far better licenses for advising
individuals than a securities broker license because the curriculum reviews various
activities beyond the nature and scope of investments. The least useful element for
CFPs is insurance advice for the reasons described above and because the
instruction in that area is way behind the times (and has been identified by CFP
officers as needing a complete update).
Continuing Education, http://www.finra.org/Industry/
53. See FINRA,
Compliance/ContinuingEducation/index.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
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to state.5 4 Neither license requires additional study of the real
value of money, the study of risk, or understanding policy
illustrations. While a competent instructor may indeed provide
critical information, it is neither mandated nor universal.
Additionally, there is no requirement for a diversity of
continuing education. One can continually take courses relating
to the same topic, which is commonly investments, for each
required reporting period. For example, CFPs are required to
report thirty hours every two years and many take the same
focus - generally investments - each required reporting period.55

The continuing education is necessary to keep advisors sharp,
but its usefulness all depends on what courses advisors are
taking and whether they are only trying to cover the mandatory
hours with minimum effort. After all, thirty hours required
every two years is not much considering the multitude of new
financial products entering the market each year. For example,
where were the independent critiques on auction securities or
the underlying derivatives for mortgages? Was there any
separate professional instruction of index annuities or life
insurance? No. And I do not think it would have done any
good to provide them in any case because: 1) most advisors
think they are truly "sharp" at understanding a product even
given only a single college course or a single semester on money
and would not attend a paid seminar, and 2) such training and
supposed recognition would only slow sales or services--so that
generally precludes any effort at true competency.
FORMAL EDUCATION As QUALIFICATION FOR FINANCIAL
ADVISORS

Post-secondary academic work generally provides advisors
with a body of knowledge that imperfectly serves the needs of
individuals, especially seniors, seeking financial planning
advice.

54. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 21.

55. See Guide to CFP Certification, supra note 36.
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LAW

Many attorneys lack knowledge of the basics of
investments, insurance, or other disciplines within financial
planning. 56 Law curriculum classes in estate planning, real
estate, and benefits are electives and, by themselves, provide an
investing
advice.57
inadequate
basis
for
appropriate
Furthermore, fundamental insurance information is missing
from law school estate planning curriculum."' The general
consensus of true planning professionals is that the bulk of
insurance in Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts is the wrong type,
and they have not been adequately monitored on an annual
basis. One could say that the responsibility for such insurance
products was turned over to others who apparently had the
expertise to implement the policies. Somewhere along the line,
attorneys have to recognize that they cannot abdicate such
responsibility in a critical area without having some idea of what
is supposed to work and who might be able to do it.
Lastly, when doing arbitration work in the past, as well as
acting as an expert witness regarding securities, investment, and
retirement cases, the author never met an attorney who knew
the correct definition of diversification. That is problematic
because not knowing the formal definition can be detrimental to
a client's case, let alone their portfolio. An attorney cannot
justifiably take this type of case to arbitration or trial without at
least a basic understanding of investing principles. (Note--they
may still be successful in achieving funds for the client, but the
case would be based on secondary issues.) Further, recognize
that attorneys addressing the risks of money without the use of a
56. See George Steven Swan, Legal Education and FinancialPlanning: Preparation
for the MultidisciplinaryPracticeFuture, 23 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 19 (2000).
57. For example, none of these courses typically require knowledge of the use
of a financial calculator, which is essential for an estate planner to determine the
present and future value of monies.
58. See Stanford Law School website, Estate Planning Description,
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/courses/details/292/Estate%20Planning (last
visited Nov. 21, 2008) (failing to mention insurance as being a topic covered in the
course).
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financial calculator are taking a large risk in breaching their
fiduciary duty. Admittedly, they may rely on experts, but most
are not versed with a financial calculator either and their
opinions should be subject to intense scrutiny as well. This is
called "defective referral," using others without a formal
scrutiny of competency.
The author recently was engaged to review a variable
insurance product. The plaintiffs used a consultant barred by
the NASD/FINRA and had only an insurance license.
Ludicrous, but neither side had done any homework on the
background.
DEGREES IN FINANCIAL PLANNING

The American College, an institution devoted to banking
and financial education located in eastern Pennsylvania,
instituted the first Master's program in Financial Planning.5 9 The
College for Financial Planning, founded in 1972 and located in
Now many
Colorado, was founded shortly thereafter. 60
universities, in every major city throughout the United States,
offer related Bachelor's and Master's degree programs.
Graduates of these programs have the most knowledge to offer
consumers. The curriculum is far more comprehensive than
anything offered by the CFP courses. In the author's personal
experience, the Master's program of study was at least 75% more
intensive on the subject areas than any courses offered by the
CFP curriculum. In particular, the estate planning coursework,
the author's area of expertise, was generally acceptable.
However, while the coursework did address the importance of
insurance for such planning, business needs, and more, it was
clearly inadequate in providing detail in the subject area.
Merely stating that insurance was needed did very little to
indicate how to decipher what type was truly necessary and
59. See Robert W. Cooper & C. Bruce Worsham, Foundations of Financial
Planning:An Overview, in THE FINANCIAL PLANNING PROCESS, 1-29, (C.B. Worsham,
ed., The American College) (2004).
60. See id.
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how it would work. The author tried some of their electives
hoping to get the insight needed and found that none existed.
Recent articles by estate
The situation has not changed.
planning attorneys still do not provide any detail on insurance
products or application.
UPDATING FORMAL EDUCATION

While the foundation of knowledge obtained at a university
is far greater, and probably motivates a licensee to learn more
after the degree, the knowledge taught becomes severely
outdated at lightning speed because the economics in the world
are constantly changing. Products come to market that were,
only a few months previously, never envisioned. 6 1 The tax rates
change, the tax laws change, the politicians change, only to
change again in rapid succession; all the while the market
explodes with entities using new exotic products put forth by
investment and insurance companies fighting for business. For
example, take the drastic growth in the mutual fund industry.
In the beginning of the 1950s, there were one hundred funds
available for investment. 62 Now, there are over 10,000 available
funds. 63
Advisors rightly state that they cannot know everything
and often refer clients to other experts as necessary. However,
this practice requires that the advisor diagnose the problem
correctly and then choose someone who has adequate skills to
address it. For example, referring a client to an estate planning
attorney for an Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust (ILIT) only
reflects that the trust's legal structure is correct, not the
underlying product in it. As a result, many elderly have effected
an ILIT that is subject to failure.
61. Examples include exchange-traded funds, indexed annuities, no lapse
insurance, and all of the Collateralized Mortgage Obligations that caused the latest
credit debacle.
62. Jim McWhinney, A Brief History of the Mutual Fund, http:/www.
investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/05/MFhistory.asp?Page=2 (last visited Nov.
21, 2008).
63. Id.
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Accordingly, continuing education is valid, but generally
insufficient and inadequate. The problem is that many of the
courses are nothing more than a rehash of old material that often
lacks updates.
Nonetheless, many brokers and planners
continue to take such courses, because they are easy and
inexpensive. There are excellent courses available, but they tend
to be geared towards investing and are expensive. Additionally,
the use of more sophisticated offerings may simply confuse
attendees who have limited backgrounds.
These facts dissuade brokers and planners from
participating in the more informative courses, especially if they
are looking to cheaply satisfy their continuing education
requirements.
FIDUCIARY DUTY IN FINANCIAL PLANNING

The financial advisor's duty is defined by tort and contract
law, and ethical oversight by professional licensing boards.
LEGAL LIABILITY

As with all professionals, a financial planner has a legal
obligation to provide services that meet the standard of care for
each individual client.64 In negligence, generally, the standard of
care is whether the respondent behaved as an ordinary,
reasonable, prudent person would have behaved under the
circumstances. 65 The professional financial planner, or one
simply presenting him or herself as such, however, has the
additional obligation to use any special knowledge he may have
obtained through education, training, or experience. 66 Further,
the law may impute a certain level of skill and knowledge
regardless of the facts when determining the standard of
minimum professionally acceptable conduct. 67 The problem is
64.
65.
66.
67.

See Gray, supra note 8, at 636.
See Cordas v. Peerless Transp. Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200 (1941).
See Gray, supra note 8, at 630.
See id. at 638.
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that while the law may impute a level of care, who is to
acknowledge what care was supposed to be provided? That is the
crux of most litigation, though rarely pursued correctly because
the attorneys, participants, judges, or experts have little or no
knowledge of proper application of the products. There are
certain experts that can address the theory of investments, very
few that can address insurance or annuity application
adequately, and almost nil who can do all, certainly as the
products address real life. Theory and application may be
diametrically opposed.
As discussed previously, the knowledge requirements for
obtaining a financial advisor designation are not highly
regulated. 68 Therefore, the greatest likelihood of legal liability
lies in the violation of fiduciary duty, the legal requirement that
an advisor put the client's interest first and act always with the
best interest of the client in mind. 69 However, this is not the case
with insurance agents, who owe their initial allegiance to the
employer insurance company. 70 Trust officers are also held to a
higher level of responsibility, but some trust companies attempt
to reduce exposure by including in the contract an exculpatory
clause in which they hold themselves accountable only for what
a prudent, but inexperienced man, would do.71 However, that
still does not exclude them from acting recklessly, in bad faith,
or willfully breaching their fiduciary duty to the trust
beneficiaries. 72
The CFP Board of Standards has only recently enacted a
fiduciary duty requirement and enforcement of these standards
became effective January 1, 2009.7 No matter--the CFP Board
68. See Swan, supra note 29, at 95.
69. See Gray, supra note 8, at 637.
70. See Gregory Boop, Insurance Agents vs. Insurance Brokers, http://
(last visited
businessinsure.about.com/od/agentsandbrokers/a/agentnbroker.htm
Nov. 21, 2008).
71. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., TRUST EXAMINATION MANUAL, http://www.fdic
(last
.gov/regulations/examinations/trustmanual/section_4/sectionjiv.html#ivd
visited Nov. 5, 2008).
72. See id.
73. Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., Focus on Ethics: Raised
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has directly stated that it will not enforce an ethical violation
unless preceded by a legal one. 74 The Board's stated rationale for
refusal to enforce ethics was that it was very concerned
(rightfully so) about subsequent financial liability if sued by a
CFP on purely ethical grounds.75
With regard to professional ethics standards, the Rules of
Fair Practice established by the NASD/FINRA state that a broker
has breached his or her duty if a broker "recommends
speculative securities without finding the customer's financial
situation and being assured that the customer can bear the
risk."7 6 This seems to be the crux of the problem identified in
most arbitrations and lawsuits. The first question to ask is what
is a speculative investment: gold, hedge funds, or perhaps some
mutual funds? While most experts would not put a standard
equity fund in the speculative category, it was arguably
speculative for a broker to suggest the use of a fund in March
2000 with knowledge of the inverted yield curve. The same can
be said about the yield curve in 2006.77 It is also arguably
speculative to use the proverbial stay-the-course ideology as the
market lost over 40% thereafter in a three-year period. Late 2008

Standards to

be

Enforced

Beginning

January 1,

2009,

http://www.cfp.net/

certificants/updates.asp#4 (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
74.
75.
76.
TAKING

Id.
Id.
ERROLD F. MOODY, No NONSENSE FINANCE: E.F. MOODY'S GUIDE TO
COMPLETE CONTROL OF YOUR PERSONAL FINANCES (R.R. Donnelly ed., The

McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.) (2004).
77. The inverted yield preordained the 2000 recession and hardly anyone had a
clue. Why? It's not tested, hence it was not taught. The inverted yield curve
preordained the 2008 recession and still but a very few had a clue. Why? It's still
not taught. Yet it effectively has a 100% record in prognosticating a recession in
twelve months. It is pretty simple to understand. Short-term rates--CDs for
example--have lower rates than a thirty-year bond. That's because the longer the
time frame in holding an investment, the more risk (everything else being equalrating, corporate, or municipal). But there are times when short-term rates are
HIGHER due to an imbalance in the economy. No economy can handle that
inversion. It makes no financial sense. Short-term rates must go down or long-term
rates must go up. Period. But any action in this correction brings financial pain-universally a recession in twelve months. Now the curve inverted again in 2006,
but the down cycle did not happen until 2008. So while it is accurate in the
prediction, the timing is not perfect; the length of recession is not indicated nor how
bad it all will be. But if no one bothers to address it, the downturn is a surprise.
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showed current losses approaching over 40% in just one year
even for the basic S&P 500 index.7 1
The troubling requirement is that the agent be assured the
customer can and should bear the risk. The only way this
proposition is effectively possible is to have the customer
complete a formal budget and project the numbers to determine
how much the client needs for the full retirement. That analysis
requires the use of financial tools that the planner is often
unfamiliar with and untrained to use. Such analysis is mandatory
for anyone who is already retired, or who is nearing retirement,
with age fifty-five perhaps as a benchmark. It should determine
the risk allocation that might be required and the amount that can
be risked with such a strategy. An advisor cannot accept the
statement of a client regarding risk. They do not understand the
losses that can be sustained with a portfolio of equities or bonds.
They cannot use a calculator nor, even if possible, are they aware
of the theoretical concepts of risk and the associated calculations.
RULE 2310 OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES
DEALERS (NASD)

(a) In recommending to a customer to purchase, sell, or
exchange of any security, a member shall have
reasonable
grounds
for
believing
that
the
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the
basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as
to his other security holdings and as to his financial
situation and needs.
(b) Prior to the execution of a transaction recommended
to a non-institutional customer, other than transactions
with customers where investments are limited to money
market mutual funds, a member shall make reasonable
efforts to obtain information concerning:
(1) the customer's financial status;
(2) the customer's tax status;
78. Fidelity.com, http://personal.fidelity.com/products/funds/mfl-frame.shtml
?315912824 (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
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(3) the customer's investment objectives; and
(4) such other information used or considered to be
reasonable
by
such
member
or registered
representative in making recommendations to the
customer79
Note that the rule references reasonable grounds and
suitability on the basis of facts disclosed by the customer. What
does or can that mean when the broker does not know the
fundamentals of investing? As to their financial situation, this is
not determinable unless a budget and formal risk scenario is
computed. Individual financial needs fall within the same
scenario. Investors may need money for college, retirementor
other purposes, but the numbers need to be crunched to
determine feasibility of planning tools and financial products.
Yet, for a broker who has never been taught to use even the basic
financial calculator, such planning is improbable, if not
impossible. 0 The rules are helpful, but the focus is on the
customer to tell the broker what to do rather than for the broker
to advise." The problem with this system is that customers are
clueless as to risk and reward, and brokers are not taught how to
deal with such issues.
A conundrum, to be sure.
Comparatively, these skills are not taught to insurance agents
either. Even if they were, it would do no good without the
ability to use basic financial tools. Financial planners, per se,
have no exposure to the criteria or analysis and often simply fail
to account for the complexity of their customers' financial
affairs. 82
79. NASD Conduct Rule 2310, NASD Manual (CCH) (Amended by SR-NASD95-39 eff. Aug. 20, 1996).
80. For example, a broker will be presented with the following dilemmas daily.
The client's financial status is nebulous at best, and can you calculate their income?
Net Worth? How are they applied together? Tax status is acceptable, but is a
broker sufficiently trained to review 1040s? (No). Customer objectives: growth
income, tax deferral, etc. But while a customer may want growth, they need to
know the inherent risk.
81. See NASD Manual (CCH), supra note 79.
82. See, e.g., California Lutheran University website, http://www.
callutheran.edu/cif (last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (offering an online Master's program
and courses in Financial Planning that would permit an individual to graduate with
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REGULATORY OVERSIGHT

Licensees are governed by professional regulatory boards
and state agencies that largely respond to consumer
complaints." Unfortunately, their involvement is generally well
after the fact, and then is not that helpful. For example, the
author had a pro bono case in Florida that bounced between
various state agencies for eight years, where the CFP agent
admitted guilt; the author is still "waiting in line" for them to
order an investigation. The CFP Board granted the individual
full exoneration even though he agreed to pay a $300,000
settlement to the plaintiffs for selling a life insurance policy to a
seventy-five year-old widow that cost more than her annual
income. 4 One does need to inform authorities of wrongs, but
unless one is generally part of a very large group who has been
harmed, formal assistance is hard to come by.
STATE REGISTRATION FOR COMMISSION SALES
There are effectively two ways of offering securities and
advice. One way is by commission and the other is by fee. They
may involve different agencies and certainly different
guidelines.

a Master's degree in financial planning without any analytical or customer training.
There are about 1,000,000 financial planners per Lutheran College's website that
likely have these or worse credentials).
83. See George Steven Swan, The Political Economy of Professional Regulation:
Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of
Accountancy, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 121, 134 (1994), quoting THE REPORT OF U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE MOORHEAD TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 139 Cong. Rec.

H2216-H2217 (daily ed. May 4, 1993) (Statement of Rep. Moorhead).
Financial planning regulation is the weak underbelly of the financial
services community.... The inadequacy of financial planning regulation
is a national problem, and it is time that we recognized that it is a
congressional concern. Many of the State legislatures have addressed the
issue of who is a financial planner and what is the appropriate regulation
provide
of the industry. Most are satisfied their investment advisor acts
an adequate regulatory framework. But not even the largest States have
the budget and manpower resources to enforce a comprehensive scheme
of regulation of the large number of independent financial planners.
84. Based on the author's personal knowledge of the case.
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If an agent wishes to do business and receive commissions
only, they have to have a Securities license for equities as well as
an insurance license for the insurance-related products, such as
life insurance and annuities."5 A broker needs to meet the
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and must have an agreement with a securities organization (B/D
or broker dealer firm) in order to transact securities business.86
An insurance licensee will have many individual contracts with
separate companies. Each insurance transaction is conducted
through an agreement directly with the company.87 The issue
for the consumer is the potential for abuse with the sale of a
product primarily for the benefit of the commissioned agent.
Commissionable sales are "tainted" because an agent will
only be compensated if he makes a sale. While the commissions
may have been reduced on stocks and bonds over the years,
commissions on insurance products are not as heavily regulated,
and can be 100% of the value of the first-year premium. Hence
the justifiable concern of a purchaser buying these products is
that the products are being offered solely for the large
remuneration and not as the best financial instrument for the
customer. Based on over thirty years of work in the industry,
the author's impression is that not all commissions are bad.
However, the negative perception is entirely justified, because
companies utilize agents with little real knowledge about their
products, who do not understand the products suitability for
different clients. High commissions on products tend to induce
the sale of unnecessary products unsuited to the client's needs.
In a recent case, the author noted that a large insurance company
not only allowed, but even promoted, the change of an
85. See Paul J. Mason et al., Conference on Life Insurance Company Products:
Current Securities, Tax, ERISA, and State Regulatory Issues, Variable Annuity Products
in the Bank Market, C954 ALI-ABA 151, 182-83 (1994) (it is usually not necessary to
have both licenses if one wishes to transact business in one field only. Both licenses
are necessary for "hybrid" securities such as variable insurance or variable
annuities.).
86. See Stuart J. Kaswell & Daniele Marchesani, The ABCs of Broker-Dealer
Regulation 2007, Broker-Dealer Regulation - Overview, 1604 PLI/CORP 9, 11-12 (2007).
87. Id.
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insurance policy for an ILIT where the commission was over
$300,000. It would have been preferable to simply move the old
policy over, but that would not have paid effectively anything.
The real wrong was that the first policy--for the same amount
and the same commission--had been purchased only two years
previously. There is an unacceptable surrender penalty of
thousands of dollars for the termination of the first policy. The
size of these policies may have been unique, but the focus to sell
another was not.
A unique element to insurance that is rarely known by
consumers is that an insurance company may offer the "same"
product but with different commission structures. For example:
assume that an annuity is offered at a 5% return with a 4.5%
commission. However, the company may also let the agent offer
the same annuity with a 4.5% return and a 5% commission.
There are no statistics in the industry indicating what is actually
happening in the field, but the author would surmise from his
experience that the higher commission prevails. This practice is
considered legal; however, the ethical justification is debatable at
best and it certainly does not pass a fiduciary responsibility
analysis. Under a fiduciary premise, the agent must take the
lower commission to fulfill his or her duty to the principal/client.
Bonus annuities are almost always a marketing gimmick.
With bonuses, a company might offer a first-year bonus of 10%
above the general stated return. If the first-year guaranteed
underlying return was 5%, the consumer now earns 15% the first
year and is highly impressed. However, the bonus ceases after
one year, and the company may very well reduce subsequent
years' returns to get back the initial bonus, probably more. Most
problematic is that the consumer cannot figure this out via the
marketing brochure they are given to base their decisions on,
because insufficient data is provided up front, and all available
data is rarely given even if requested. Equally problematic is
that the agent cannot do the number crunching either (no
capability with a financial calculator) and simply markets the
initial increased return with little to no understanding of its
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ultimate future ramifications.
STATE REGISTRATION-FEE FOR ADVICE

Different oversight is required for brokers and insurance
agents who charge fees for their advice, as opposed to
commissionable products.88 It is necessary to note that simply
providing advice and paying a fee has been a major focus of
articles for the past fifteen to twenty years because of the
concern about the sale of a product solely for the commission.89
As a result, the extremely high commissions on such products
have declined due to the competition of fee products and
advisors." (The transparency is generally for the brokerage
industry products--stocks, bonds, and mutual funds.
Commissions for insurance products have seen little disruption.)
But recognize that a bad advisor is a bad advisor, fee or
otherwise, and that if you do not have a knowledgeable agent,
the end result will often be lost money no matter the
remuneration.
Also note that some fee products may cost more than
commissionable products, most notably life insurance, and may
not perform as well. But, where applicable, a fee product can
offer a substantial reduction in costs and that can provide a large
increase in returns over time. 91

88. See Carl B. Wilkerson, The Status of Broker-Dealers Engaged in Investment
Advisory Functions:Muddy Waters Slowly Clearing,SN034 ALI-ABA 609 (2007).
89. See id.
90. See Jonathan Clements, Due Diligence: The Five Key Rules to Heed Before
Hiring a FinancialAdvisor, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2006 at D1.
91. For example, assume $100,000 at 7% gross for ten years, and you pay 1.5%
annually in fees and a 4% front-end commission. That leaves $96,000 net after
commission earning 5.5% net. In ten years that would grow to $163,982. Again,
assume the same situation with a no-load fund (no upfront fees) and a .5%annual
fee for running the fund. That leaves 6.5% net. In ten years, that is $187,714. That
is a huge difference, but the numbers can be deceptive--was the consumer actually
able to pick the right no-load funds directly? Can the client do asset allocation? If
not, perhaps they need assistance from a fee planner. Let's say that cost was .5%
annually. The net return is now 6%, and the total return for ten years would be
$179,085.
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INVESTMENTS AND INVESTORS

INVESTORS
A securities broker wishing to charge a fee for advice must
be a Registered Investment Advisor (RIA) either with the SEC or
with the particular state. 9 2 The registration does not imply
particular competency, it merely describes the background of
the advisor and what and how they will charge.93 This fee
service has reached prominence since the mid-1990s, primarily
as it reduced the focus on commissioned equities products. It
certainly is a viable concept when using mutual funds, because
there are a huge number of no-load funds that cover most
investing allocations, such as Vanguard and Fidelity funds.
However, advisors may still charge 1% to 3% annually for the
'right' to maintain the account, providing such services as
changing allocations and rebalancing. This extra charge can
easily negate the advantage of a no-load fund. Also, higher fees
may accrue when commissioned agents use loaded funds and
also charge fees. The consumer must still do some homework to
determine if the fees are justified and the advisor worth the cost.
To minimize costs and still get advice, it is possible to
engage a CFA using no-load funds for a .25% annual fee.9 4 If a
consumer needs ongoing financial planning help--college,
retirement, health care, estate planning, insurance--a fee
upwards to 1% can be justified.95 But paying excess fees to
monitor an investment, where the basics can be had for as low as
.25%, does not seem valid. However, that is exactly the situation
92. See Barry Y. Greenberg, Hedge and Private Equity Funds - Recent Regulatory
Developments, 1687 PLI/CORP. 271 (2008).
93. Id.; see also Securities and Exchange Commission, How to Register as an
Investment Adviser, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iaregulation/regia.htm
(last visited Nov. 21 2008).
94. See Clements, supra note 90 (showing that if an investor's intent is to simply
have an allocation designed and then monitored, just what is an extra 75% or more
for the effort adding?).
95. See Jane Kim, Money's Worth: Figuring Out How Much You Should Pay for
FinancialAdvice, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2006 at DL.
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for the industry-advisors doing simplistic and borderline
financial plans in order to get assets under management for a fee
at 1% or better.
INSURANCE

Insurance is a convoluted and mind-numbing industry.
When analyzing mutual funds, stocks, and the like, there are a
myriad of services that can provide detailed statistics--Value
Line, 96 Wall Street Journal, MorningStar 97--to name a few.
Obviously, one can misinterpret the data, primarily because
economics over time can alter such factors as a sound allocation,
but at least the advisor can actually see what was invested and
where at almost any time. The same cannot be said of
traditional insurance. There has never been any service that has
provided analysis of the exponentially increasing products in the
industry. There are services that provide insight to the financial
condition of the company, such as A.M. Best, 98 Standard
&Poor's,99 and Moody's Corporation, 00 but they provide no
insight to the inner workings nor the true viability of the
individual products. The insurance companies keep the inner
workings of the products pretty much a secret. Further, unless
one is using a term policy or similar, the variability of a policy
over time (mortality charges, expenses, and internal yields) can
lead to all sorts of problems such as surrender charges, lapsed
policies, and unexpected income taxes. In the context of estate
and business planning, this analysis is enormous and critical, far
greater than with everyday investments.
That being true, however, the consumer is between a rock
and a hard place, because many need life insurance and must

96. Value Line, http://www.valueline.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
97. MorningStar, http://www.morningstar.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
98. A.M. Best, http://www.ambest.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
99. Standard & Poor's, http://www.standardandpoors.com (last visited Nov.
21, 2008).
(last
100. Moody's Corporation, http://www.moodys.com/cust/default.asp
visited Nov. 21, 2008).
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licensee can provide industry information about the companies
and their new products; the companies and insurance agencies
send such material only to licensees and they buy the lists of
agents from the various state insurance departments.
Unfortunately, the communications are as intrusive as junk mail
and telephone solicitors, and about 95% are nothing more than a
focus on the best commissions and extra incentives for meeting
selling quotas. But, it is the only way that one can get insight to
current and proposed products and be able to derive any value
from an insurance advisor. Of the remaining material, one will
have to do additional research to determine the true viability of
the product. This may also require attendance of sales and
informational seminars to ferret out what is going on. It is hard
and time-consuming, and there is little industry data on which
to base an analysis.
Another problem is that the policy illustrations, while not
legal documents per se, are designed to provide consumers with
an idea of what they might anticipate in the future and the
In the hands of a purely
expected cash value returns.
independent, knowledgeable, and objective advisor, these can be
extremely helpful. But they are not used as such. They have
become marketing spreadsheets with all sorts of irresponsible
numbers introduced, including high inflated returns, low
mortality charges, and minimal expenses in order to make
products look better than those of competitors.
A fee advisor will supposedly take all this information and
distill it into something understandable and possibly find a
lower cost product. For the most part, however, that is not
going to happen, either legally or competently. For example, the
majority of at least thirty-five states have additional licensing
requirements in order to charge a fee for providing insurance

101. Although there are internet sites that provide assistance, use them only if
you are extremely healthy. Otherwise, you are likely to be turned into an
unacceptable policy risk.
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advice.'0 2 California, for example, has a mandatory Life and
Disability Insurance Analyst License. 03 These are essentially the
only entities in the state that can provide independent fee
analysis on life and disability insurance policies. There are only
about thirty-three licensees in the state, as compared with
170,000 sales licensees and agencies in the state.10 There are
about 8,000 CFPs. Comparatively, there is only one CFP (that is
not a misprint) who has ever passed the exam and can offer
comprehensive fee financial planning services in the entire state.
The exam is very hard and there is nothing in other
designations, save for the Chartered Life Underwriter and the
Chartered Financial Counselor, that provides an in-depth insight
of insurance.0 5 As such, nearly all CFPs and CPAs--and most all
other planners including those with NAPFA membership--act
illegally in charging fees for comprehensive planning advice in
the most populous state in the nation.0 6 California told the
organizations to get their agents properly licensed, but they
refused, and some told their agents to keep providing "advice"
but simply keep quiet about it. But one cannot be a fiduciary
while acting illegally.
In summary, most planners lack the requisite skills or
qualifications to even discuss insurance properly because the
knowledge is largely confined to the companies that will not
permit the information to be disseminated. An insurance
licensee is often self-limited in offering good advice, because the
commissions can override a true duty to consumers. Fee
102. See Foster, supra note 9, at 143 fn. 4 (citing Skillern & Lubben, State
Regulation of FinancialPlanners,2 FIN. SERV. REG. 1, (Jan. 15, 1986)).
103. See
California
Department
of
Insurance,
supra
note
23,
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0200-industry/0050-renew-license/0200requirements/life-disability.cfm.
104. See id. at http://interactive.web.insurance.ca.gov.webuser/licw-name_
search$.startup.
105. See Agent Broker Training Center, Chartered Life Underwriter (CLU),
http://www.abtrainingcenter.com/CLU.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2008) (providing
an overview of the coursework and training required to successfully complete the
certification tests).
106. See, e.g., Letter from Errold Moody, Jr., available at http://blogs.
tampabay.com/money/files/designations.pdf(last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
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advisors are even worse in knowledge base, and most are
illegally practicing the profession. Accordingly, it is hardly
difficult to understand why so many people end up doing the
wrong thing with life insurance policies and annuities. The
governmental agencies are woefully understaffed, and they
don't know how to analyze sophisticated products for the most
part. They do not get involved until the scam is severe, but it is
well after the fact and after the damage has been done.
If one needs insurance, pick a licensed advisor with a valid
designation who has at least 10 years' experience. The use of a
new agent--or certainly an advisor--with no experience or
interest or license--is fraught with financial disaster.
THE CONCEPT OF RISK

Central to the concept of consumer advice and choice is
understanding of risk over time and change of circumstances.
Important calculations involve the diversity of investments and
the likelihood and disclosure of both gain and loss.
DIVERSIFICATION AND CORRELATION

The concept of diversification is critical to understanding
any interest and investment in such products as stocks, bonds,
mutual funds, and ETFs.
Investor understanding of
diversification could have limited the problems that were caused
by the Enron, Worldcom, and the dot-com disasters and the
current real estate and credit debacles.
Diversification is not merely a mantra of "don't put all your
eggs in one basket." That provides no statistical application and
is useless in any formal proceedings to evaluate or remedy
harm. Rather, the question is "how many stocks do you need in
a portfolio in order to insulate it from unsystematic risk,"10 7 or
107. Systematic risk refers to the movement of the market overall. Unsystematic
risk refers to the movement of individual securities that are impacted by their own
unique business. This uniqueness can be tempered by adding in enough noncorrelated or randomly correlated securities so that the portfolio acts more like the
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"how many stocks do you have to have in a portfolio for it to be
properly diversified"? Prior to availability of information on the
Internet, with day trading and immediate 24-hour international
trading (starting in the mid 1990s), statistics tended to reflect
that one needed fifteen to twenty stocks to 'mirror' the entire
market.10
The selection had to be random--not all the
companies could be doing the same thing at the same time for
the same reason. This effect is called correlation--how one
company (or country) reacts to another given certain economic
scenarios. If the sample stocks were highly correlated, for
example if the companies were all involved in the same type of
overall
and
glass--the
steel,
rubber,
industry--autos,
diversification is lost and one might need 100 or more stocks to
attempt to mirror the index.10 Even when picking various
industries, such as transportation, pharmaceuticals, and finance,
it is necessary to analyze many different areas and companies.
Consumers, and their advisors, rarely have that capability.
Due to the proliferation of trading opportunities and the
transfer of securities around the world and the clock, trading in
individual securities has vastly increased in volume.o10 While
the overall volatility of the entire market is roughly the same, the
increased volatility of individual issues now demands at least 50
to 350 stocks to reach the same level of diversification as a few
stocks would have accomplished fifteen to twenty years ago."1

index it is trying to mirror.
108. See Andreas Fleckner, Stock Exchange at the Crossroads,74 FORDHAM L. REV.
2541, 2567 (2006).
109. Correlation, serial correlation, and cross correlation is a statistical attempt in
defining how one stock moves with or against the movement of another. And by
how much? The problem with this- and similar to the use of historical numbers- is
that it takes a period of time to determine how accurate the numbers are. Most
analysts figure about a year. But by then the economy has changed, and it takes a
sophisticated estimate as to where everything might now be. Consider the credit
debacle, recession, and how the international movement of securities has and has
not been impacted.
110. See Fleckner, supra note 108, at 2554-79 (explaining recent history of
exchange and how it has become available to the masses).
111. See John Y. Campbell et al., Have Individual Stocks Become More Volatile? An
Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk, J. FIN. 1 (2001), available at
http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/-campbell/papers/clmx.pdf.
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No matter the number, the increase in complexity makes sound,
unadvised consumer choices nearly impossible.
In sum, no one can say that they are a competent investor or
advisor unless they know diversification by the numbers. No
broker can gauge risk to the investor by a single security or
within a portfolio without a calculation of diversification and
correlation.
Mutual funds tend to be diversified in that they generally
hold a number of securities in different types of industries. But
the mixture of different funds in a portfolio--called asset
allocation--must also address the element of correlation. The
result of such an analysis should be provided to the prospective
consumer in writing. The industry has not been required to do
this, and, indeed, it is not even taught. That it is hard to do is no
defense for not doing it. But one must have the knowledge base
first and foremost, because an unknowledgeable entity trying
this has, by definition, breached their fiduciary duty.
STANDARD DEJIA TION AND VOLATILITY

Almost all the numbers presented to clients by brokers,
planners, or computerized plans are deceptive at best and a lie at
the worst. 112 Once again, the constraints limit a full analysis, but
112. Very few planners have the breadth and depth of knowledge to analyze a
client's situation and independently determine what should be done.
Consequently, some planners buy various software packages that supposedly
determine the allocation of investments. The cost of these packages may range
from just a few hundred to several thousand dollars. The programs indicate that
some type of historical pattern/analysis is being used to reflect proper allocation.
But does anyone know what is actually being computed? What correlation? What
period of history? The best comment comes from a statistics professor who said,
"You can use any calculator program on a test as long as you write the program.
Otherwise you don't know dirt about what the program tells to you." I repeat the
necessity of using a personal financial calculator and identifying what the inputs
are. When all is said and done, the consumer really likes a computerized plan since
they perceive a correctness and absolute indication of an allocation. And because
they do not know what they do not know (and have made no effort to do any
homework), this marketing element will hold its position for decades. This is not to
say that certain programs may not be right(?), but unless you tear them apart, there
is no way of knowing. Pundits should be aware that I have torn apart both
insurance and planning programs and found them using incorrect numbers. I do
not mean the assumptions were wrong--I mean the computations were wrong
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this is the crux of the problem. If there is a financial goal in the
future, certainly retirement, and some type of stock, bond, or
mutual fund portfolio is recommended and utilized, the returns
are invariably shown as a flat rate over time. Therefore there is
"always" a nice lump sum amount of money that will be
computed by a software program to be available. Such numbers
are very easy to compute. But while it is true that time flattens
out volatility, such analysis is generally deceptive. This is how it
works in simplistic terms.
Volatility and standard deviation reflect how much the
price changes around the norm. For example, if the average
return for a stock over a year is 10% (roughly the return over
fifty years), it statistically will fluctuate (about two-thirds of the
time and called one standard deviation) from a -11% to as high
as 31% (+ or - 21%) during a one-year period. But if the portfolio
was held for a period of, say five years, the standard deviation
will drop to 8% (simply divide the annual deviation (21%) by the
square root of the years held (2.236)). That is quite a drop and
implies that potential losses are reduced significantly over time.
If "risk" is mentioned at all, what is portrayed is how volatility
goes down over time. But volatility is NOT risk, ipso facto. Per
Peter Bernstein, "[violatility is often a symptom of risk but is not
a risk in and of itself. Volatility obscures the future but does not
necessarily determine the future."1 13 Nonetheless, the industry
interchanges the two and then is able to project a 10% return (or
whatever), hypothetically, with a perceived high degree of
expectation. Heck of a deal. Except it is a complete fallacy, save
by luck.
Risk is how much you have and can lose at any given point
in time. For a regular equity allocation portfolio, over a period
of five years, one is apt to have only 40% to 60% of what was
anticipated." 4 It is true that one can have 40% to 60% or more
(TransAmerica Insurance; American Express allocation software).
113. Peter L. Bernstein, What Happens If We're Wrong?, June 22, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/business/22view.html?ret-business.
114. Here are the statistical measures of standard deviation and projected losses.
(Admittedly, the opposite side is true of returns. It is possible to have a huge
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than projected, but that is not the point. It is how you need to
focus on a goal, particularly retirement, when the investment is
needed.115
An advisor cannot accurately name a flat rate of return with
a variable product. While it is simple, easy to communicate, and
easier for most potential consumers to accept, it is wrong and
dishonest. Depending on the time frame, one can have far less
than expected. Consider the following hypothetical investor,
amount of money during retirement and at death. But that is not the real world of
planning during retirement--it is to have enough funds given most market
calamities.) The longer you hold a security, the greater the risk of a major loss.
Assuming a 20% initial standard deviation and a hold period of five years, one uses
the formula (1- .0894)5th and it yields .626. This means that the final five year
wealth may be only 63% of projected (and that is just for one standard deviation- a
68% probability in itself. If one uses three standard deviations, the risk is even
greater). The statistic represents a 37% loss from projected value- far greater than a
one- year 20% swing. INVESTMENTS by BODIE, KAHN AND MARCUS, 224 (Richard
Irwin Inc.) (1989):
... [T]ime diversification does not reduce risk. Although it is true that per
year average rate of return has a smaller standard deviation for a longer
time horizon, it is also true that the uncertainty compounds over a greater
period of years. Unfortunately, this latter effect dominates in the sense
that the total return becomes more UNCERTAIN the longer the
investment horizon. Investing for more than one holding period means
that the amount at risk is growing. This is analogous to an insurer taking
on more insurance policies. The fact that these policies are independent
does not offset the effect of placing more funds at risk.
I emphasize the date of the book of 1989. The formula for the position of loss is not
a new calculation just invented. It has been known far in advance of the 2000- 2002
financial debacle, but remained universally unacknowledged by the securities and
planning industries. Consumers are unaware of this material. They cannot be
expected to search it out either. However, true advisors must seek it out,
understand it, use it, and properly convey the implications to consumers.
If one takes a twenty-year hold period, the risk of loss (obviously) increases.
For long-term consumers who are under the guise of a continued buy and hold, the
risk of a loss is so excessive as to make a retirement a far greater risk proposition
than has ever been addressed by the industry. Assume a 20% initial standard
deviation and a twenty- year period. The standard deviation drops to 4.47%. The
appearance of low risk. But the risk of loss is calculated by (1-.0447)20th= .40. That
means that the end result could be only 40% of what is expected (and this is based
on just one standard deviation). This is critical information to any investor. It is
mandatory that an investor be presented a detailed statement of this statistical risk.
These numbers are not far-fetched, nor purely theoretical, with no application to
real life. In fact, it is the reality that these numbers have a direct bearing on the lives
of hundreds of thousands of consumers, literally all retirees, and pension plans.
That is exactly what happened in 2000- 2002 and is happening in 2008.
115. This is not an isolated occurrence. The Author has worked on plans from
American Express, UBS, and others. Risk is not defined correctly and the clients are
clearly misled.
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who had $100,000 in the market for ten years starting in 1990.
This investor would see a huge gain of around 17%, varied due
to exact dates, dividend adjustments, etc., for a total of close to
$500,000 before the dot-com era went under. The investor likely
used that record to define a lifestyle and anticipated retirement.
In the following three years, however, that investor lost about
44% and had only $270,000. Did this happen to many? Yes. The
losses for the retirees during that period was estimated about
one trillion. The current financial debacle is far from over, but
estimates indicate that over two trillion in retirement funds have
now been lost just in the last fifteen months." 6 Didn't they know
that such risk was a definite probability? Generally no. It is not
taught to advisors and is not tested; accordingly, it is not
communicated to investors.
It also would slow sales by
introducing more uncertainty and a healthy appreciation of the
real risk to the potential investor, certainly in sales of singleissue securities.
The theory for loss is based on statistical numbers that can
rarely be violated. But it is not necessarily real life in toto. The
point is this--one does not have to be in the market for a long
time to suffer significant losses as the formula implies. Anyone
putting money into the market in 2000 went on to suffer
immediate losses. The scenario is not much different for the last
year. Formulas do not tell you when the market might retrench
nor by how much. But a financial debacle at the initial stages
could decimate a portfolio to the extent that it might never
recover before a retiree's death. Can these debacles be predicted
and possibly avoided? Yes, though not with perfect precision.
See inverted yield curve addressed previously.
For a real life example of how this plays out. Here are the
requirements for an agent in dealing with suitability from
Investopedia.
The concept means that an investment is appropriate in
116. Jennifer Levitz, Workplace Retirement Plans Suffer $2 Trillion in Losses, Oct. 8,
2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122342685954113657.html?mod=googlenews
-wsj.

2008]1

ELDERLY INVESTMENTS

171

terms of an investor's willingness and ability (personal
circumstances) to take on a certain level of risk. It is
essential that both these criteria be met.
If an
investment is to be suitable, it is not enough to state
that an investor is risk friendly. He or she must also be
in a financial position to take certain chances. It is also
necessary to understand the nature of the risks and the
possible consequences.'1 7
Note that the definitions from literally every site suggest the
same thing in reference to risk, that the investor can grasp and
manage risk."18 It is effectively gibberish, since risk can be
evaluated and explained by few advisors, let alone the general
public. The statistical numbers are not identified. Further, the
majority, at least 95% of all advisors, do not have the capability
to calculate the risks to the customer, and those that do simply
fail to do so." 9
The obvious issue, at least hopefully, is that the industry is
suggesting that the consumer is the one who identifies and bears
the burden of risk. This is illogical in the extreme given the
client's lack of knowledge and an advisor's fiduciary duty. One
cannot simply discharge a fiduciary duty of a perceived
knowledgeable advisor by shifting responsibility to the ignorant
clients. Such a shift cannot relieve the advisor of the fiduciary
responsibility for subsequent problems and losses. It matters
not that the agent would not know the facts. It matters that the
agent and the firm have accepted the responsibility to know and
proceed accordingly with clients. The point being is that they
should divulge the facts even though it might kill the sale.
Some may find this criticism too harsh. However, Enron
was harsh, the dot-com crash was harsher, and the current
housing debacle and credit mess harsher still. It should not be
possible that such entities as Merrill Lynch, Bear Steams, and
Credit Suisse can cause a meltdown that created a recession or
117. See Brian Bloch, Investment Suitability 101, http://www.investopedia.com/
articles/financialcareers/08/suitability.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
118. See id.
119. This is not a diatribe--I have worked in the industry for over 30 years with
'regular' agents, CFPs, and the like. The sophistication is absent throughout.
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threatens a depression.120 Did they not understand risk?
No.
URGING GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT

Since the mid 1990s, due in part to his instruction on the
various securities licenses, the author attempted to get the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and FINRA
to provide proper education to the brokers and securities
arbitrators. The author had acted as a NASD arbitrator for a
number of years, and he never knew a securities attorney or
arbitrator who knew diversification by the numbers. The policy
statements predicated my action, in part, by such entities as the
SEC, NASD, NASAA, and AARP, who always indicated that
they were there to help and protect the public. Primarily hollow
words. In a 1995 letter to the NASD, the author pointed out that
"Agents in the business are rarely taught anything of real world
use through the licensing training [and I indicate the specific
shortcomings] . . . Correlation and asset allocation - also

necessary to understand suitability - are essentially missed in
the entirety . .. agents are woefully unprepared to provide even

the most rudimentary analysis of a client's needs." Over the
past decade, the author has urged change to the SEC regarding
arbitrator reform, to Federal Chairman Bernanke on consumer
education, to Joe Borg of the (NASAA), and to Mary L. Schapiro,
CEO of (FINRA,), with no results.
Indeed, in a 2006 speech, Schapiro observed:
... [This] subject [is] one that will surely shape the role

of regulators well into this century-investor education
120. Many U.S. securities firms buy mortgages and repackage them to banks
and other institutions. See CMOs (collateralized mortgage obligations) above.
They marketed them as being safe and secure. But such ratings were undercut by
the lack of formal underwriting when effectively anyone over the last few years
could buy a house with lousy credit. And they used loans that could escalate.
Nobody thought that this was a problem because the conventional wisdom states
that "home prices do not go down." Wrong. When they did, all the repackaged
loans got marked down substantially and caused a worldwide credit crisis. See
WALL ST. J., N.Y. TrMEs, or any major business section for the main companies who
offered such packages. Arrogance and incompetence prevailed.
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as investor protection. I believe very strongly that the
people best able to protect investors from mistakes,
misunderstandings, deception or outright fraud are the
investors themselves-if they are knowledgeable about
investing and the markets. I cannot overstate the
importance of this, particularly given that we're facing
a looming crisis-the impending retirements of millions
of baby-boomers, many of whom are financially ill
prepared to stop working.121
The statement is disingenuous at best. More pointedly, the
idea that FINRA and related regulatory entities are going to
bypass the industry and provide the necessary insight to
consumers is absurd. Schapiro confirmed that when she
asserted that the NASD "is a procedural entity not a substantive
one."1 2 2 None of the government entities, including the SEC,
FINRA, NASAA, and state insurance departments provide
effective consumer education as described here. That is not
going to change because of lack of funds, staff, and knowledge
and the sales orientations and motivations rooted in the financial
industry. Further, the reply that the author got from the NASD
in the 1990s sums it up - "they [the industry] will never allow it
[education of the fundamentals] since it would slow sales." Sad,
but absolutely true.
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND CONSUMER COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT

So far the focus has been the breach of duty of the industry.
But there is also the issue of the absence of research by the
consumer. For over thirty years, the author has tried to get
average consumers/investors to do their reading homework to
learn to protect themselves. It has not worked and I see no
changes forthcoming. If investors do not read the material
necessary to protect themselves, as well as limit their emotions
121. FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Speeches/Schapiro/PO17671 (Last
visited Nov. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Schapiro].
122. The point was that FINRA merely provided the avenue for complaints, not
the mandatory education of brokers or attorneys. That is true; that is what they do,
except it does little to help the average consumer who knows effectively nothing
about risk (but neither does the government).
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(which may not be possible without an emphatic statement by
some entity they will listen to, Oprah, perhaps), they tend to use
irrational practices in dealing with investments.
Decades ago, theory held that the selection of investments
seldom deviated from a rational process.' 23 But around the
1950s,Professors Kahneman 24 and Tverskyl 2 5 conducted research
that shows this was not correct. Kahneman, who won a Nobel
Prize for work on the subject, explained:
A basic assumption is that in standard economics and
in financial analysis, people are assumed to be rational.
What is meant by that is not that they know everything,
but that they have a consistent system of beliefs, that
they act on their beliefs and that they have consistent
preference.
Now when you abandon those
assumptions of rationality or similar assumptions that
people make within the context of finance, and you
accept assumptions that are psychologically realistic,
then you are doing behavioral economics, and if you
are doing finance you are doing behavioral finance.12 6
During the last ten years, studies have confirmed and
detailed likely investor thinking. Frank Caliendo 2 7 and Kevin
Huangl 28 describe the results:
With growing empirical evidence on persistent
overconfidence, much attention has been paid to the
question of why people are overconfident and
experience does not lead them to become more realistic,
especially in activities like investing where results can
be calculated ex post. Existing studies demonstrate that
self-serving attribution bias (past successes tend to
exacerbate overconfidence as people take too much
123. See Investor Home, Psychology & Behavioral Finance, http://www.investor
home.com/psych.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2008).
124. David Kahneman Autobiography, http://nobelprize.virtual.museum/nobel
prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahneman-autobio.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
125. Amos Tversky Biographical Information, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Amos_Tversky (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
Finance,
Psychology
&
Behavioral
Investor
Home,
126. See
http://www.investorhome.com/psych.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
127. Frank Caliendo - Biography, available at http://fcaliendo.com (last visited
Nov. 21, 2008).
128. Kevin X.D. Huang - Biography, available at http://ideas.repec.org
/e/phul5.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
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credit for their successes, while past failures tend to be
ignored as people blame their failures on forces beyond
their control), confirmatory bias and cognitive
dissonance (tendency to overweigh data confirming
prior beliefs while to dismiss data contradicting prior
beliefs), illusion of control, and forces related to
evolution and tournaments or contests, can all
contribute to generating persistent overconfidence
throughout the life cycle. 12 9
Conformity, on the other hand, causes people to change
their behavior as a result of pressure from others. One of the
major findings from academic studies of the behavior of
individual investors is that it is the very nature of people to
make irrational investments.130 If you sell a stock that is
currently worth more than you paid for it, then you can pat
yourself on the shoulder for a successful investment. When you
cut your losses on the stock, in contrast, you have to accept
punishment right now for having made a choice that did not
turn out well. It is not surprising that people prefer rewarding
themselves rather than punishing themselves. On average, you
will do much better if you sell losers and hang on to your
winners. This is a pretty good example of normal investor
behavior leading to generally bad outcomes.
Simple statistics include that men are more overconfident
The
and trade unnecessarily far more than women.131
disposition effect: when people are selling stocks from their
portfolio, they tend to sell winners and hang on to their losers.
Cognitive dissonance causes people to rationalize actions that
differ from their own preferences. Herd behavior causes us to
invest simply because others are doing it. The author does wish
129. See Frank Caliendo & Kevin X.D. Huang, Overconfidence in FinancialMarkets
and Consumption Over the Life Cycle (Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of
available
at
Paper
No.
07-3,
2007),
Philadelphia,
Working
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=961367# (last visited Nov. 21,
2008).
130. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling? Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital
Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REv. 987, 987-1005 (1992).
131. See TIAA-CREF, Are You a Rational Investor?, 3, http://www.tiaacref.org/administrators/pdf/adminlibrary/C38907.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
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to make specific reference to this (and then to Affinity Scams) as
two of the leading errors that mislead the public (and target the
elderly). People choose to use behavioral finance instead of
reading and understanding their own investments. For a
historical example, look to the meltdown of the dot-com world
in 2000. The National Association of Investment Clubs (now
Better Investing) membership peaked during the dot-com
boom. 132 Between 2004 and 2008, membership decreased by
55%.133
Thousands of "investors" milling around in a nonsophisticated environment found the next best stock or fund that
would supposedly produce fantastic returns--only to finally
recognize that they and their 'sophisticated' compatriots were
clueless to the elements of diversification or to economic risk.
There is simply no way that an organization could lose 55% of
its members when it was offering competent advice in a
professional setting. The author is not addressing the fallacy of
getting advice from co-workers, friends, or fathers. He is talking
about an organization that touts its professional ability to
educate the masses about investing. But if one visits their
website, you will find a major orientation towards an analysis of
stocks. As William Bernstein said, "[hluman beings cannot pick
stocks, period."134
The point with the above commentary is that it may be next
to impossible to get people to actually orient themselves to being
objective about their investments. Just how is the above
supposed to be presented to the public to make them aware and,
more so, to make them react? It's a rhetorical question since I
know of no answer. People like what feels good, tastes good,
looks good. Reading and thinking are not in that category.

132. Jen Haley, How Investment Clubs are Reacting to Market, Nov. 3, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/personal/11/03/investment.clubs/index.html.
133. Id.
134. Nalini Indorf Kaplan, 7 Investing Mistakes You Cannot Afford to Make,
http://ezinearticles.com/?7-Investing-Mistakes-You-Cant-Afford-to-Make
&id=1560421 (last visited Nov. 23, 2008)
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AFFINITY SCAMS

This is another element of behavioral finance and is an
extension of the refusal to do research of literally any type. The
States' Attorneys General have noted this as one of the main
reasons why so much money is lost. It has everything to do with
clubs, affiliations, and, absolutely, churches. When people are in
association of others with similar interests, they tend to let their
guard down.
They trust the others in the group almost
irrespective of the activity- golf, for example. A great social
activity for business. But note the author said "social." It has
nothing to do with competency.
For example, religious
affiliations are one of the greatest areas for soliciting victims of
investment fraud, or just to get clients to begin with. The
Lutheran Brotherhood Broker Dealer organization used to give a
church to an agent as his "farm area." But they have nothing to
do with competency.
The most obvious example imaginable is Madoff. $50
billion lost due to a personality defined as a Jew, at the Palm
Beach country club, at the Glen Oaks Country Club, and
whatever non-economic arena that impressed prospective
clientele."'s "Madoff was a member, and other members sought
introductions in hopes of being allowed into an even more
exclusive investment club that brought steady, double-digit
returns even when the market was down." 3 6 Statistically, such
returns have never occurred with regularity, nor will at any time
in the future. But irrational human behavior can universally
eradicate rational thought and reasonable research.

THE SOFT GROUND OF REFERRALS

The industry is heavily focused on referrals from clients.
135. Alan Fleur & Christine Haughney, Standing Accused: A Pillarof Finance and
Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2008, at B1.
136. Greg Allen: Florida'sPalm Beach Rocked by Madoff Scandal (NPR radio broadcast
Dec. 16, 2008).
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Agent training simply tells new agents that if they wish to be
successful, they must get at least ten referrals from a prospect
even if they did not make a sale to the initial client. 37
Consumers used to give such names only to get the salesperson
out of the house. The agent then approaches the unsuspecting
new client who assumes the agent has been thoroughly checked
out by their friend/relative/co-worker. Journalists regularly
suggest one get a referral when seeking assistance. 38 It is a
potentially reasonable position, but with the same result. No
homework. Further, why would one want a referral to an entity
with no understanding of risk? All in all, it is the consumers'
tendency to use all sorts of esoteric mannerisms, outside of hard
work, to select the agent to do business with. No matter the
rationale, it boils down to trust. But generally unsubstantiated
trust. Yet the frauds and losses seem to keep repeating, and in
literally every bad investment scenario, the one singular
universal quote is, "but I thought I could trust him," for all the
aforementioned reasons.
WIDESPREAD EDUCATION

Here is a continued quote from FINRA CEO Mary Schapiro
in 2006 on the dearth of knowledge. "Making matters worse is
that Americans, by and large, are not particularly well-schooled
in how to manage their own finances, nor do young adults enter
the workforce with even a basic appreciation of the importance
of starting to save and invest for retirement early." 139
Schapiro is absolutely correct that Americans need help
with finances. But nice words don't cut it when FINRA does

Machine,
Bates,
Priming
the
Prospecting
137. See
Peter
http://www.advisortoday.com/resources/prospectmachine.html (last visited Nov.
21, 2008); see also Annuity Pro Shop, The Most Endorsed and Affordable Annuity
Marketing and Sales Training, http://www.annuityproshop.com/referredleads.html
(lasted visited Oct. 14, 2008).
138. See, e.g., Letter from Errold Moody, Jr. RE: California Financial Literacy
Summit, available at http://www.efmoody.com/PRMay2008.html (last visited Oct.
14, 2008).
139. Schapiro, supra note 121.
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nothing to help the educational process of its own agents.
Unfortunately, it is not the only floundering organization.
At the April 2008 California CPA symposium on Financial
Literacy, there was some excellent material on savings, credit
cards, and budgeting that was being introduced to the schools. 140
However, their offering regarding investing will lead more and
more consumers to the poor house. It consisted of a fluff video
produced by PBS, showing a young black kid with a single
mother making good by buying some Nike stock. 14 1 Just Nike
stock. The author does not dismiss his effort in looking at a
Price/Earnings (P/E) ratio. The author is happy that he made
money and could now buy lots of Nike shoes. But he was now
"teaching" other kids how to invest in this high-risk manner.
The video was being shown in many schools (and to 500
attendees at the Summit) and getting a lot of interest from the
kids.14 2 But most of it for the wrong reasons. The interest lay in
the fact of how easy it was to look at a couple of statistics, buy
one stock, and make a killing. That is gambling, pure and
simple. The purchase of a singular stock violates just about
every fundamental understanding of risk since the singular
position was 100 to 500 times greater than the market itself. This
will simply lead to more unknowledgeable consumers hoping to
make it big time by using a single issue. Enron, Worldcom, etc.
should have made this type of material obsolete, and
condemned into nonexistence, as it is both unconscionable and
irresponsible.143 Yet, the old adage echoes true, those who do not
learnfrom the past are doomed to repeat it.
CONCLUSION

The financial services industry has failed to evolve to
include the fundamentals of investing, including informed
statistical evaluation of risk and diversification. One likely
140. See Moody, supra note 138.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id.
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motivation for resistance to the inclusion of such fundamentals
is that the knowledge would reduce sales simply because risk is
identified. The consequences are not trivial. Such knowledge
clearly could have limited the irresponsible exposure that caused
the most significant market upsets in the past decade and might
cause prolonged recession, not just in the United States, but also
worldwide, arising from the current housing crisis debacle. The
solutions lie not only with the industry, though the industry
must stop hiding the ball and begin to serve its own consumers
and better educate its staff. The current criticism for the failure
of the SEC to investigate and shut down the Madoff Ponzi
scheme is absolutely acceptable.
An effective solution must include the elements of
behavioral finance and take into account the fact that human
beings often do not act rationally with regard to the purchase
and sale of investments. For the elderly, the problem is more
pronounced since elders do not have the luxury to make up
In addition, the
losses from unacceptable investments.
increasing number of elders with disabilities with modest
retirements, who are isolated from the community and
competent financial advice, are being grossly victimized due to
the their known vulnerabilities and fear of loss, susceptibility to
deceptive sales tactics, and outright frauds being perpetrated by
unscrupulous persons.
Buried in fundamental commonsense lies a singular
screening tool. There is one singular element that has the
potential to help avoid at least 85% of all bad investments and
scams. 1 44 "Never, never, never give money to anyone unless they
have and can effectively use a financial calculator. You do not
give money to anyone who does not know how it works."145
144. MOODY, supra note 76.

145. Id. (FORBES thought it was particularly valid when they stated, "[E]xcellent
suggestion. Either they don't know or they don't care." Additionally, the CFA
organization is using the statement in their licensing training. But how many of
America's elderly are reading FORBES before they turn over their nest egg to a slick,

unqualified financial scam artist? The correct answer is few, so it is imperative that
those professionals serving this highly susceptible group advise and counsel them
in a manner that will protect their financial future.).
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From those advisors that are left, the author would choose
only a degreed planner with at least 10 years of experience. He
would demand a proper definition of diversification and risk
before permitting a client or family member to rely upon their
advice. They must have an insurance license if just solely to get
the current material within the industry. By the time you get
through some more questions, there will not be many choices
left. Moreover, they may not belong to your church, and they
may not even live in your city. So be it. People simply have to
start to realize how important their money and financial future
is.
Ultimately, knowledge must encompass real life risks
associated with investing, including individual, public, and
private opportunities. The investor need not figure out various
sophisticated derivatives, but they must learn the fundamentals
and the associated risks within these basic investment vehicles.
Then the individual should be able to ask the pertinent questions
of those entities (Merrill, Lynch, Bear Steams etc.) who appeared
clueless as to their own activities and have been found wanting
in upholding the fiduciary duties to those they serve, leaving
investors with the heavy responsibility of self-education.

